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ABSTRACT  Movies are produced as unique prototypic media content to 
serve a highly uncertain demand. Film producers have to address the 
consumption risk while their projects are still in their development 
phase. This paper provides a literature review of key risk dimensions of 
movie projects and how to control them. The interviews conducted with 
movie producers have made it possible to compare the industry’s risk 
control strategies. Content attributes, personnel, and funding emerge as 
key project resources and risk reducing elements both in theory and 
practice. Three distinct risk control strategies are identified and assigned 
to different resource configurations and market constraints of individual 
producers. 
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This paper focuses on the development phase of movie production in 
which projects are selected rather than on movie distribution; it 
concentrates on producers developing a movie package rather than 
production companies building a portfolio of several movie projects. But 
first let us clarify the term  “producer”. For this paper movie producers 
will be regarded as project managers. They remain attached to a project 
throughout the entire production process, from the start with a brief 
story outline until the distribution in various channels. In Hollywood, 
producers were introduced as project managers already in the 1930s to 
cope with the ever increasing complexity of the movie production 
(Bernstein, 1993). However, in European markets, where there is a 
strong tradition of “film d’auteur”, the producer has long been regarded 
as an annoying assistant to the writer-director whose obligation is to  pay  
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the bills. For this paper the Hollywood perspective will be used, with the 
producer as the person with the economic and creative responsibility of 
the movie project. Over the years, the term has been used to refer to 
those with a broad range of necessary competences that may defy one 
single description, making difficult to settle on one generally agreed upon 
definition. There are no formal entry requirements to the field so 
anybody can claim to be a producer and receive the corresponding screen 
credit (Iljine & Keil, 2000; Lee, 2000). Development, financing, produc-
tion and distribution all call for specific expertise thus it comes to no 
surprise that seldom a single person can do the job alone. A sound 
characterization of a producer’s obligation is provided by Iljine and Keil 
(2000: 185-255). Using a generic process of movie production, they 
identify four distinct phases with corresponding job roles for the producer 
ranging from development to distribution (see Figure 1). 
In the first phase the producer acts as a more or less creative story 
developer. The task is to search, identify and secure qualified stories and 
develop them into a realizable script. The second phase of project 
development calls for the strategic capabilities of the producer who needs 
to serve as an agent bringing together script, cast and crew, and 
financing to form a marketable movie package. Only if the package is 
approved, the phase of physical  production  begins,  where the  producer  
 
Figure 1: Phases of a Movie Project and Corresponding Producer Roles 
 
 
Adapted from to Iljine and Keil (2000: 208-209) 
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needs to use his skills as operating manager dealing with creative 
workers and suppliers. The closing distribution and exploitation phase 
calls for the producer to act as media marketing manager. In practice 
only in small, low budget productions all these tasks can be accomplished 
by a single person. This paper concentrates on the first two phases, 
where the producer defines a movie project that is creatively and 
economically sound. Thus the focus is on the creative producer, who has 
to integrate the two maybe sometimes opposing poles, creativity and 
profitability, when setting up a project. Project management and 
coordination skills in the physical production phase will not be analyzed 
since Ribera and Sieber (2009) dwell on it at length in their article 
included in this special issue. However, the power relations within the 
value chain of a movie project force producers to plan ahead and thus to 
anticipate an address risk of subsequent phases. 
The crucial step in movie project development is the Green Light: in 
between phase two and three a major transition takes place as prior to 
the start of the principal photography only relative small amounts need 
to be spent to option the script and the personnel. With phase three the 
talent has to be paid and the technical equipment needs to be rented. 
Thus before physical production begins, there is a final assessment of the 
movie package where the heads of the production company and the 
investors decide on the economical viability of the project and whether 
the profit estimation justifies the necessary investment. In the industry 
jargon this assessment is called the Green Light. Only in the rather 
seldom case when producers also carry the final economic responsibility, 
e.g. producer-entrepreneurs, can they Green Light their own projects. 
However, more often than not producers need to pitch their projects to an 
executive board which approves or rejects the project. Every time movie 
producers start developing a new project, they face the risk that their 
project eventually will not be approved. Thus the development process 
can be described in terms of risk management: producers need to 
identify, assess, and control the risk inherent in their projects in order to 
increase the chances of a Green Light (see Figure 2).  
Before possible strategies to control risks can be discussed and the 
actual strategies of producers can be analyzed, the dimensions and scope 
of risks that occur in the development phase need to be systematized. 
The next section will provide an overview. 
 
 
RISKS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOVIE PROJECTS 
The movie business has to deal with all risks that occur in the 
development, production, and distribution of “ordinary” goods. However, 
a movie’s dual character as economic and cultural good as well as the 
project-based production process lead to additional risk factors that 
cannot be as easily  insured as,  e.g.  a  fire  on  the  production  premises. 
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Figure 2: Risk Management Process in Movie Development 
 
 
 
 
Traditionally, two major fields of risk in the movie industry are 
identified: (1) production and (2) consumption risks (Bächlin, 1945). Both 
initially do not seem to be relevant in the development phase. However, 
only if the project definition provides confidence for later phases of the 
production and distribution, the project will get a Green Light and 
proceed. Besides these two indirect risks, producers also face two more 
risks directly relevant in the development phase: (3) the reputation risk  
covering intangible damage resulting from a consumption risk 
incidence—a producer’s reputation is harmed whenever a project is not 
approved or fails to meet the market demand, and (4) the development 
risk deriving  from the uncertainty that the control measures of the 
production and consumption risks are considered not sufficient and the 
producer has to bear the costs of all unrecoverable expenses up to the 
negative Green Light decision. In the following sections the four risks 
shall be described in more detail to allow for a thorough analysis. 
 
Production Risks 
The production risk evolves from the peculiarities of the production 
process. Movies  emerge  from  the  combination  of  numerous  individual  
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Figure 3: Risks in Movie development and Production 
 
 
 
 
inputs that need to be coordinated and controlled. Furthermore, the 
production risk is determined by production costs for  the  first-copy  that 
are fixed and completely sunk. If a project is aborted, the invested capital 
cannot be realized and if the product does not meet the demand, no 
adjustments can be made in the production process. The essential risk in 
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the production phase is about completion within time and budget. This 
risk can be covered with a completion bond. However, the bond insures 
the financial interests of the investors in the project. If the bond is called 
on, the producer usually loses all rights to the project (Lee, 2000; 
Alberstat, 2004). Thus the producer will need to find additional measures 
that suggest a completion within time and budget, such as experienced 
and motivated personnel, production routines, contractual terms and 
other aspects that help to reduce the problems of a one-off production. 
Furthermore, completion bonds might guarantee the completion but they 
have no influence on the quality of the resulting movie. Therefore, Adam 
(1959: 51) emphasizes the “risk of artistic creation” as an additional 
aspect of the production risk. The collaboration of different professions 
with divergent objectives (see DeFillippi’s article (2009) in this issue for 
further details) can lead to complications. Artists, technicians, and movie 
managers follow different ideals that need to be coordinated and unified 
towards a common goal (Prindle, 1993; Wallace et al., 1993; Caves, 2000). 
Although the general audience might not reward artistic and technical 
perfection, it seems short-sighted  to opt for short-term profit whenever 
these interests conflict. De-motivated or embittered personnel tend to 
shrink and have massive influence on the quality of the final project 
outcome since all inputs are combined in a multiplicative production 
function. 
 
Consumption Risks 
The consumption risks derive from the fundamental uncertainty about 
the demand. The consumption is contingent on consumer taste and the 
value for users is fixated only during the usage experience. The demand 
for a movie can hardly be determined in advance and it is largely 
independent of the invested production budget. Aggregated overall 
demand for movie entertainment can be forecasted (Hand, 2002; 
Dewenter & Westermann, 2005). However, over time audience tastes 
change following trends. Individual movies face strong competition from 
other movies and alternative leisure activities. In principle the 
consumption risk should be managed later in the value chain by 
distributors with a better understanding of the consumer demand. In 
practice, it should have already been addressed in the development 
phase since distributors have a powerful position in an market with 
numerous producers facing only few distributors. Distribution is the 
bottleneck within the value chain, therefore distributors can shift their 
risk on the producers (von Rimscha, 2008). Unlike in the television 
business, commissioned productions with distributors covering the 
complete consumption risk do not exist in the movie business. In some 
cases the producers can shift the consumption risk further along the 
value chain to the personnel they hire, since there is a power asymmetry 
with the number of talents exceeding the number of projects. The 
uncertainty about the resulting success also leads to a funding risk. As 
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an intangible good, a movie project lacks the collaterals necessary to 
satisfy investors or lenders. Producers need to control the risk inherent 
in the project to reduce the probability and amount of potential loss to 
secure investor interest. Thus for the producer the consumption risk 
translates into a development risk (see below) whether the risk 
management efforts are rewarded or not. 
 
Reputation Risks 
With no clear indicators of quality, incomplete contracts are common in 
the movie industry (Caves, 2000). Producers cannot be sure whether an 
actor delivers the expected performance, just as distributors cannot be 
sure to meet audience demand. The contractual uncertainty must be 
substituted with trust. In incomplete markets, an advanced trust is 
necessary if quality information cannot be obtained at all or only at a 
prohibitively high cost (Albach, 1980: 5). The actors need to trust each 
other to receive the proposed service at the expected level of quality. 
Trust in the movie business is not “blind” with protagonists hoping for a 
good outcome without clues, control measures or threats of sanctions 
(Pelzmann, 2005), but derived from the reputation of the individuals 
involved. Trust is a reaction to the specific risk-setting. It can be defined 
as something equivalent to a contract to reduce behavioral risks in 
complex transactions: “Trust implies voluntary advances while waiving 
explicit security or control measures against opportunistic behavior but 
expecting that even without such securities others will not act 
opportunistic” (Ripperger, 2004: 45). For reputation to be effective as a 
control measure, a breach of trust must be observable, reports about it 
must be credible and reach potential future partners of the trust receiver 
(Nooteboom, 2005). With the reputation mechanism, the donators of trust 
can amplify the effect of incentives or sanctions. Assumptions about trust 
diffuse further than the personal social networks to unidentified others 
(Eisenegger, 2005; Bentele et al., 2005); therefore trustworthy actions 
have meaning beyond the actual transaction. Voswinkel (2001: 119) coins 
this brokered acknowledgment “Second-Hand-Impression”. Reputation 
has a crucial role in the justification of trust expectations by the trust 
donator. The higher the frequency and the volume of the transactions 
based solely on trust, the more important building and cultivating a 
trustworthy reputation becomes and the more motivated movie 
producers are to live up to their reputation (Ripperger, 2004). “The more 
experience tells you that a company has fulfilled expectations in the past, 
the more confident stakeholders (e.g. customers, investors) will engage in 
transaction with this company” (Eisenegger, 2005: 37; see also Fombrun, 
1996). This relation is especially relevant for services like those of movie 
producers offering intangible experiential or credence goods (Herger, 
2006). Producers with a positive reputation are preferred, since their 
reputation guides expectation in uncertain contexts. Stakeholders have 
to make risky decisions so they seek advice when consulting expectations 
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about salaries, profits, product and service quality and the like. 
Reputation allows steering and stabilizing theses expectations and 
thereby reducing stakeholder risks. Reputation is a factor of value 
creation that at least partly determines the success of a production 
company and an individual producer (Larkin, 2003; Herger, 2006) and 
leads to repeated collaborations. Repeated collaboration can be described 
as reputation-driven path dependencies (see Sydow (2009) in this issue). 
The reputation risk describes the value of the producer as collateral 
within the movie package. It is an aggregated measure derived from the 
handling of production and consumption risks in preceding projects. If 
these risks have been managed well in the past, the same is expected in 
future. Thus for the producer the reputation risk is more relevant for 
future projects than the actual one. The management of production and 
consumption risk has a meaning beyond the daily business since it 
creates reputation as a sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
Development Risks 
Like the consumption risks, the development risks are based on the 
uncertainty of the demand, in this case the demand of the distributors 
and investors for a movie package as a preliminary product. Distributors 
and investors cannot be sure whether the product meets their 
expectations so the movie package must be regarded as credence good. 
Script, cast and other elements of the package can be inspected but it is 
uncertain whether the resulting movie will meet consumer demand. 
Distributors rely on the reputation of producers and need to trust in the 
ability of the producer to anticipate and serve the audience’s interest. To 
gain trust, producers have to use their financial and reputational 
resources to optimize the movie package in advance. However, producers 
cannot be sure that their projects will be realized—in fact only 10% are 
(Epstein, 2005). If a project is not approved or put in turnaround with a 
different producer the effort of the initial producer is in vain. The 
development risk lies in the possibility that a project is not approved at 
all or realized without the developing producer. It results from the 
sunken development costs as well as from the balance of power along the 
value chain of the movie business. 
 
 
Controlling Risks in Movie Projects 
Having identified the relevant risks in the development phase of a movie 
project the question arises what producers can do to address them. Most 
existing work focuses on the consumption risk in the audience market 
and the question how to influence, plan, and control the audience 
interest. The success of already published movies is used to forecast the 
demand for new movies. Beginning with Litman (1983) several authors 
have tried to identify characteristics of a movie project or its producers 
that determine success (Prag & Casavant, 1994; Albert, 1998; Sedgwick 
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& Pokorny, 1998; De Vany & Walls, 1999; Chang & Ki, 2005; Hennig-
Thurau, Houston et al., 2007). Most studies use a marketing perspective, 
and discuss how to capitalize a completed product. This research on 
success factors can be used in an analysis of the development phase and 
the movie packaging. To obtain a Green Light, producers need to explain 
to decision makers why the proposed movie package is likely to result in 
a successful movie. An obvious line of argument points out that a project 
features elements identified as beneficial in success factor studies. The 
numerous proposed forecast models (Sawhney & Eliashberg, 1996; 
Neelamegham & Chintagunta, 1999; Eliashberg et al., 2000; Chang et 
al., 2005; Hennig-Thurau et al., 2006; Delen et al., 2007) can be used to 
determine an expected value of audience interest and thus quantify 
consumption risk. Thus, it can be assumed that crucial success factors 
such as content attributes, personnel traits and funding also indicate the 
relevant areas of risk management in the development phase. 
In the following section of the paper actions suggested in the 
literature shall be discussed as to how producers can secure their most 
relevant project resources to manage the project risks. The discussion 
follows the structure provided by the fields in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Risk Control Measures in the Relevant Resource Areas 
 
 Resources 
Content Personnel Funding 
M
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Avoidance Lectorate Motivation  
Reduction 
Market research 
Standardization 
Imitation 
Long-term 
contracts 
Equity financing 
Transfer  Salaries Public funding 
 
Avoiding Risks 
In terms of content movie producers benefit from the fact that supply of 
movie scripts exceeds demand. Scripts do not need to be created or 
commissioned, but producers need to identify the most promising ones. 
Major Hollywood studios employ freelance readers to evaluate scripts 
and provide a synopsis and educated recommendation whether to further 
develop the script or not (Eliashberg et al., 2007). Reasons why a script is 
rejected can be clearly identified (boring, clichéd, etc.), however the 
promotion of a script depends also on off-topic “political” aspects such as 
assumed preferences of executives or favors owed (Gray, 2007). In his 
study on criteria used by lectors in the U.K., Macdonald finds no finite 
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set of requirements and agreed definitions. Generally, craft skills, visual 
appeal, a clear structure, originality, and the notion of a realistic 
budgeting are highly rated, while prior knowledge of the story 
(adaptations) are considered less important. The lectors are used to 
secure fresh ideas that are well crafted; however, aspects of popularity 
are widely neglected. It helps filtering out the worst scripts and avoiding 
obvious flops but cannot identify potential hits. 
To avoid risk concerning the personnel producers need to assure they 
work with motivated and dedicated individuals. Morley and Silver (1977) 
identify four main sources of motivation. First, movie personnel have a 
basic need to exercise competence, since they derive satisfaction from 
accurately accomplishing a task suiting their interests and abilities. 
Secondly, a need for approval and appreciation might motivate if one’s 
work is valued and appreciated. However, Caves (2003) argues that 
artists who are in it mainly for art’s sake might follow individual 
concepts on how creative work is to be performed. These first two aspects 
of motivation are rather generic and do not relate to special traits of the 
movie and the development and production process. However, in a 
multiplicative production function everyone involved affects the quality 
of the ultimate result so they are more relevant than in industries with 
additive production functions. A third motivation derives from a sense of 
professionalism, a commitment to the working standards established by 
peers. From the producers’ perspective, the forth source of motivation, 
long-term career self-interest, is most important, as it implies a possible 
penalty. Talents hope to enhance their professional reputation with the 
quality of their work and their association with a hoped-for commercial 
success. This might contain excessive artistic tendencies. Several authors 
focus on conflicting objectives between creative talent and the producer 
where the “suits” aim for a commercially appealing movie, whereas the 
talent strives to create an artistic masterpiece (Chisholm, 1997, 2004; 
Goldberg, 1997; John et al., 2003; Weinstein, 1998). Chisholm suggests 
profit-sharing contracts as a possible remedy of this principal agent 
problem. Participation in revenues motivates talent to care about the 
commercial appeal and thus serves as solution to the moral hazard 
problem where producers are unable to monitor the efforts of an actor. 
Weinstein (1998) negates the motivation aspect but argues profit sharing 
could be explained with a risk-sharing motive or budget constraints. 
Frequent contracting in the industry provides more incentives for agents 
to perform to the best of their ability than contingent compensation could 
ever do. Shirking is prevented because talents cannot rely on long-term 
contracts and depend on their reputation derived from performance at a 
sufficient level. In a people business information on talent behavior 
travels quickly, no matter whether good or bad. Thus talent reputation is 
an important measure to avoid risks. The recruiting process of competent 
personnel can be cut short by hiring leading personnel who bring along 
their assistants with whom they have a long-term work relation based on 
trust and experience. This is especially true for technical personnel such 
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as cinematographers or the sound department. The quality of key 
creative talent and compatibility with the rest of the team must be 
explored by “firsthand knowledge, word-of-mouth reputation, and 
conversations with other people in the business” (Morley et al., 1977: 61). 
Thus experience and connectedness of producers is crucial. This 
architectural knowledge (Jones et al., 1997) is needed in any project-
based organization and determines the ability to choose which human 
and social capital resources to use in a project. Miller and Shamsie (1996) 
refer to  “systemic knowledge-based resource” used to coordinate roles. It 
is derived from a firm’s experience in selecting non-permanent 
production staff. The architectural knowledge is inherent in a firm’s 
human capital, and in the case of movie development in the producers 
experience in similar projects. Jones and coauthors (1997) can show that 
project member experience and expertise can explain a great proportion 
of the performance variance. In terms of strategy, this poses an entry 
barrier to the industry since producers with no prior experience by 
definition lack access capabilities and coordination skills. 
When it comes to funding, avoiding risk is difficult: Most measures 
that help reducing the probability of loss at the same time increase the 
budget and thus the potential amount of loss. Inversely, this means that 
attempts to avoid financial risk reduce the leeway of producers when 
trying to acquire content or personnel that is more expensive but comes 
with a certain level of popularity. Although there seems to be a 
correlation between the budget of a movie and the box office (De Vany et 
al., 1999; Hennig-Thurau, Henning et al., 2007), the relation to profits 
seems to be inversed. On average low budget movies have a higher 
return on investment than high budget ones (Ravid & Basuroy, 2004; 
Hennig-Thurau, 2004). To a certain extent funding is substitutable since 
the same script can be turned into different movies with different price 
tags: producing in a low-wage country, reducing the amount of digital 
effects or convincing the personnel to postpone their claims all help to 
keep the budget down. However, overall, the financial risk cannot be 
avoided without consequences for the content and the personnel. 
 
Reducing Risks 
The risk inherent in content attributes is reduced by reference to existing 
stories or story elements that ensure familiarity and thus reduce the 
uncertainty about the product quality among the audience and the 
decision makers: what attracts viewers also permits a Green Light. 
Producers can secure familiarity by adapting content from other media, 
or by using common plot structures and patterns of storytelling. 
Moreover, they can use market research to assess whether the proposed 
content resonates with the potential audience. Resorting to a story 
blueprint that has proven its appeal in another media (comics, novels, 
TV-shows, plays and video games) or in earlier incarnations as movies 
(remakes and sequels) can be regarded as an extension of a content 
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brand (Hennig-Thurau, Houston et al., 2007), and signaling measure 
towards the audience (Basuroy et al., 2006). However a movie needs be 
original in some sense not to alienate the audience by being too repetitive 
(Sood & Drèze, 2006). Instead of re-narrating an existing story, 
producers can build a new one based on generally agreed standards on 
how a story should be crafted. These standards can be derived from 
veteran script writers reviewing their work (Field, 2005) or by referral to 
psychoanalytic archetypes (Jung, 2001 [1934]) creating a mythical 
structure that forms the basis of every successful story (Vogler, 1998). 
This cumulates in books that claim to provide a set of master plots or 
characters (Tobias, 1993; Schmidt, 2001). 
The idea of underlying story patterns is intuitively convincing, 
however it is not empirically tested, and therefore can only be conceived 
as “best practice”. Empirical approaches to content characteristics of 
creative work are rare since the value criteria are fuzzy and taste-
depended. Eliashberg, Hui and Zhang (2007) identify “clear premise”, 
“logical ending”, “early exposition”, and “coincidence avoidance” as the 
most relevant among 22 plot criteria using a classification and regression 
tree. However, these criteria explain less variance in the success than 
genre and formal aspects of a script. Resorting to patterns of storytelling 
is a risk reduction strategy that is hard to measure. However, using data 
mining methods the relative value of a screenplay could be assessed and 
this approach could be transferred from the realms of gut feeling to a 
measurable strategy. Risk might also be reduced by adjusting a story to 
the audience demand using market research techniques focusing on 
familiarity. Although market research has a long tradition in Hollywood 
(Bakker, 2003), it is not very popular among producers, especially those 
who consider films as artistic venture (Handel, 1953). Market research 
for experiential goods like movies demand the product to be all but 
completed, thus it is used predominantly in the distribution phase 
(Yoder, 2004). Some authors believe market research can be used to 
reduce the project risk even in pre-production (Wyatt, 1994), when the 
concept, the cast or the title are tested. Even if the idea for a movie might 
not be tested, the quality of its ingredients can be assessed. Market 
research is also feasible if a movie is to be adapted from other media 
when the producers need to assess the awareness already in the 
marketplace and which brand associations they can build on (Marich, 
2005). Generally, the problem of reliability of audience appraisement of 
innovations arises. Familiar content is rated high, while innovative 
content is rejected, so the merits of market research in the development 
phase are ambivalent. On the one hand it reduces risks by securing 
familiarity, on the other hand it might even create new risk by 
streamlining a script to be predictable.  
An obvious way to reduce risks associated with the personnel is to 
employ stars. Industry wisdom suggests that stars come with an inbuilt 
audience that reduces the uncertainty of demand. Stars can be regarded 
as ingredient brands (Hennig-Thurau & Dallwitz-Wegner, 2004) serving 
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as quality signal (Albert, 1998; Levin et al., 1997). Stars are used as an 
explanatory variable of box office performance (Simonet, 1980; Litman, 
1983; Wallace et al., 1993; Sochay, 1994; Bagella & Becchetti, 1999). The 
results are somewhat mixed with huge differences concerning the 
explanatory power. With no correlation between the participation of a 
star and the profitability, stars can capture their economic rents (Ravid, 
1999). The value of the personnel to a project only becomes evident after 
it is finished. Whenever team members have proven their drawing power 
at the box office or catalytic effect during the production, it would be 
desirable for the producers to retain their commitment. However, after 
the collapse of the studio system, long-term contracts with talents have 
all but disappeared. Personnel is usually hired on project by project basis 
(Weinstein, 1998), so long-term contracts with stars have become less 
relevant, while knowledge-based resources such as coordinative talent 
gained importance (Miller et al., 1996). Interpersonal networks based on 
reputation replace long-term contracts. Producers need to know potential 
talents and carefully foster their relationships (Jones & DeFillippi, 1996; 
Ferriani et al., 2007). Thus producers with a good reputation can reduce 
their risk by hiring a reputable cast with an inbuilt audience.  
The financial risk can be reduced if part of the budget is covered by 
investors or distributors who pre-buy the exploitation rights. However, a 
movie in development has no collaterals to offer to lenders or investors 
apart from rights to the script. Everything else is speculation about how 
the resources put into the movie will be able to attract an audience. Thus 
credit funding is not available and in the lack of creditable demand 
forecast, equity funding relies essentially on the producers’ reputation 
and that of the contracted personnel. On the  fact that other industries 
offer higher average returns on investment than the movie industry 
Alberstat writes: “Without some compelling reason other than love of 
movies, there are better places for investors to put their money” (2004: 
59). Thus reducing the risk with equity funding does not necessarily 
mean projects need to emerge as commercially promising, but could also 
mean building from a creative reputation that resonates with a 
particular investor. 
  
Transferring Risks 
The risks associated with the content generally cannot be transferred. 
However, producers might use step deals with authors that include a 
marginal upfront fee while the better part is only remitted when the 
movie is actually produced or reaches a certain number of viewers 
(Litwak, 1998). These deals again exploit the power structure in the 
industry where the risk is shifted to the weakest link. 
Profit sharing contracts can also be a means of transferring risk to 
the personnel. Few contracts actually stipulate that losses will be shared 
as well; however if stars waive their fees in exchange of a profit 
participation, the risk is actually transferred as potential salary 
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shortfall. Caves (2003: 80-81) suggests that talents “may trade off cash 
compensation for credit in a film that appears likely to garner critical 
esteem.” Creative workers, caring about their product, can be exploited if 
the content suits their nonmonetary interests. Stars trying to preserve 
their market value will only agree to take part in a project if they believe 
that other resources attached to it match up with their own quality and 
carry the potential of success. Stars act as control agents of input quality 
(Franck & Opitz, 2003). As a result, stars not only demand higher fees or 
participations, but also call for a higher budget on other inputs and thus 
increase the potential amount of loss.  
The financial risk of a movie project cannot be transferred to private 
investors without giving up rights, control, and profits. Private money is 
only available if the project elements suggest a commercial success. On 
the contrary, public funding is usually not dependent on the expected 
revenue or profit but rather on objectives derived from cultural or 
regional politics. The transfer of financial risk is only possible if criteria 
such as a contribution to the national cultural heritage are met (Bagella 
et al., 1999; Jansen, 2005). This strategy option is thus only available if 
the subject matter of the project is preferred by the relevant committee 
or if a commitment is made to spend the subsidies locally. Tapping into 
public funding may imply abdicating economic objectives. Producers 
focusing on this kind of funding reduce their risk as they live on the 
production process alone, however, they might also lose the potential of a 
hit movie, since public funding requires personnel and content resources 
that are not necessarily demanded in the commercial market place. In 
the context of the Green Light decision, public funding might be 
appreciated as it turns a risky entrepreneurial venture into a rather save 
provision of service. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH TOWARD RISK CONTROL IN 
MOVIE PROJECTS 
Let us now turn to the question of how the theoretical findings on risk 
control can relate to the actual individual producers’ conduct in the 
industry. Existing research either presents options of action on 
aggregated firm level or uses a film studies approach to “film d’auteurs” 
who are predominantly artistically oriented. However, this study 
attempts to seek answers to  how producers create a project that is 
potentially successful if the production and distribution risks are 
controlled during realization. The better a producer can convince the 
Green Light decision makers that the project risks are addressed in the 
movie package, the better the chances of approval, and the smaller the 
development risk. Thus the research question is: How do producers 
control risks in the development phase of a movie project? This includes 
the question about the relevance of the introduced research results on 
control options for production and consumption risk. Several general 
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conditions have an influence on the producers: First, the higher the 
budget of a proposed movie project, the higher the potential loss. This 
leads to an increased urgency of risk management measures. Second, 
working within a vertically integrated or diversified corporation with a 
high output portfolio endows the producer with strategies which the 
counterpart in independent and small companies would lack. This means 
an increased urgency of risk management measures if a project has to 
stand for itself. Third, general market characteristics such as the size 
and quality of available inputs and the level and nature of the demand 
create a limiting framework. The importance of these influencing factors 
needs to be reflected in the studied sample and in the discussion of the 
findings.  
The openness of the research question calls for a qualitative 
approach, where producers and their projects are analyzed in detail. 
Therefore, semi-structured personal interviews with producers were 
conducted. Sixteen producers, 12 from Germany and 4 from the US (4), of 
various backgrounds sharing a track record of approximately 245 movies 
produced between them were interviewed for the purposes of this 
research. With a self-employed freelancer as well as a head of production 
of a division of a multinational media corporation, the sample reflects the 
factors of  influence mentioned above. In some cases diversification is 
evident only within the personal portfolio of the managing partners who 
are involved in other businesses. Most of them have been to a film and 
television academy. Among them was a former investment banker, a 
doctor of business administration, an actor, a psychologist, a solicitor, 
and a historian. Three producers used to work for artist agencies before. 
The sample reflects the fuzzy job description and the lack of formal 
entrance barriers while it avoids focusing only on art-oriented producers. 
According to their companies and projects, the interviewees can be 
arranged along the dimensions of budget size, level of integration and 
diversification, and differences in the industry structure between 
Germany and the USA.  
 
 
RISK HANDLING IN PRACTICE 
The interviews confirm the proposition by Pokorny and Sedgwick (2001: 
157) that producers stress the high level of risk in their work, however 
they are neither able nor willing to systematize their risk handling, but 
present their work as “alchemy” based on superior intuition. In the 
interviews producers claim that: “You just feel, whether a project has to 
be done or not” or “You have to consult your gut”. It  cannot be ruled out 
that the quotations are part of the producers’ self-portrayal as creative 
talents rather than a factual description of daily work. One would need 
either to observe producers in their work or conduct additional 
interviews with other actors reflecting the producers’ behavior. However, 
the results also comply with reports on the British market where 
90 Journal of Media Business Studies 
 
producers in the development phase point to the creative aspects of their 
work and are unwilling to regard themselves as entrepreneurs. “Their 
principal objectives are to earn an income and make films about which 
they care passionately. They have no desire to increase turnover or 
company size,” according to Davenport ( 2006: 253). The interviewed 
producers seldom participate in the profit of the movie and hardly ever 
expose themselves to personal financial risk. With an average success 
rate of 10% and an average output of less than three projects a year, this 
individual risk aversion comes as no surprise. The individual risk 
management demands that the projects need to be funded externally. 
The financial risk management is primarily based on the producers’ 
twofold reputation. On the one hand there is the professional reputation 
that producers are able to complete a project within time and budget, on 
the other hand there is creative reputation that they can anticipate 
audience interests. Although reputation is indicated in the interviews as 
crucial trait when securing input factors, reputation risk is neither made 
an issue nor actively managed. Reputation is depicted as hard to 
influence. Producers seem to believe it just comes with decent and 
reliable job performance. 
The interviews show no structured approach towards the 
identification, assessment and control of risk in the development phase of 
a movie project. Vertically integrated production and distribution 
corporations come close to the idea of a risk management system when 
development and distribution discuss the merits of a project already 
before the Green Light decision. The individual positions of producers 
have an influence on the perception of the risks. Producers involved in 
the physical production stress production risks but neglect strategic 
risks. Producers who also act as managing partners care more about the 
consumption risk as they have to act as entrepreneurs addressing the 
needs of their customers. To some extent this is true also for the 
producers working in vertically integrated corporations where they need 
to comply with the needs of the distribution division. 
 
Measures of Risk Control Depend on Producer Characteristics 
The utility of certain measures of risk control depends on the accessible 
input markets and the intended audience. German producers complain a 
lack of bankable stars in Germany who could guarantee an inbuilt 
audience. Thus theses producers need to rely on a good coordination 
within the cast, or, as Meiseberg and Ehrmann put it, “The real star is 
the team” (2008). For the American market the situation is different: 
Bankable stars are available, however their utility depends on the 
market segment addressed by a producer. Producers of low budget 
movies need to do without stars. They confirm the negative impact of 
stars on the profit (Ravid, 1999; Hennig-Thurau, 2004). Independent 
producers acknowledge the risk-reducing effect of stars but try to get it 
without cost by offering profit participations instead of upfront fees or 
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hope to hire upcoming stars. Only producers in major studios regard 
stars as good measure to reduce risk provided that star image and role 
correspond. Since investors and production heads would look out for 
stars, all producers realize the potential risk-reduction of stars, but only 
few can afford it. 
Acquiring scripts also differs according to the markets. German 
producers usually use scripts written by just one author, often the one 
who wrote the preceding novel. It is uncommon to employ additional 
authors to improve certain aspects like the dialogue or adding gags. 
German producers complain about a shortage of interesting scripts and 
writers. Therefore, it is essential to acquire scripts that initially provide 
a high quality and a proven efficacy with the audience and thus the 
investors. To German producers script acquisition is a crucial element of 
risk control. They highlight the relevance of good relations to writers and 
publishers to gain access to licenses of bestselling novels. Producers of 
children’s movies only use scripts that are established enough to be 
considered brands, because neither the producers nor the distributors 
have enough marketing power to create brands from scratch the way 
American animation studios do with brands like Nemo or Shrek. On the 
American market there is no shortage of scripts and screen writers are 
considered “text workers” rather than “story creators”. There is a broad 
range of scripts available and it is common to constantly revise script 
drafts. Thus script acquisition is a less crucial element of risk control. 
While German producers indicate bestsellers as most important source, 
American producers have a more generic approach to secure familiarity 
for the audience or as someone put it “It definitely helps us to have some 
component of genre, some kind of familiar trope”. 
In terms of funding there are two different frameworks influencing 
risk control. To secure the funding a project has to assure that investors 
can realize their objectives. Commercial investors’ dominant objective is 
profit maximization, even if they have some sort of cultural impetus. 
Producers relying on those investors need to stress out the commercial 
viability of their projects. European public film funding has different 
objectives focusing on the promotion of regional industry clusters and the 
promotion of projects considered culturally worthwhile. Several 
producers notice that film boards recently tend to be more economically 
oriented as they have to justify their spending towards the public budget 
and the tax payers. However, as someone said “the way film boards and 
investors are approached should wisely differ”. This supports the finding 
that depending on the artistic ambitions of the filmmaker, different 
funding options lead to better results (Fee, 2002). Primary financier and 
project objective need to match although producers keep repeating their 
mantra that creativity and commercial appeal are not mutually exclusive 
and they strive to combine both aspects in their projects. 
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Controlling Financial Risks in Movie Project Development  
Three generic strategies on how to address the risks of a movie project in 
the development phase can be derived from the interviews. Besides the 
dimensions of budget size and the level of corporate integration and 
diversification, market conditions on the input markets and the intended 
audience also influence the risk management of producers. Especially the 
availability of public funding and bankable stars seem to be important. 
The depicted strategies should be regarded as prototypic. They are not 
mutually exclusive but can be combined, at least to a certain extent.  
The first strategic option, reducing the probability of loss (see Figure 
4: a) tries to maximize demand by employing inputs with positional good 
characteristics. Cause-related risk is addressed by a reduction of the 
occurrence probability. When acquiring expensive elements to reduce 
risks, producers accept an increase of the potential amount of loss. 
Familiar personnel and stories shall reduce the audience’s uncertainty 
about what to expect and thus solve the issue of a movie as an 
experiential good leading to consumption risks. Risk is controlled 
through the hiring of stars that draw the audience’s interest and thus 
guarantee revenue for the Green Light decision makers. Story templates 
can also concentrate audience interest; however, with a less distinct 
positional character, risk reduction is less reliable. This strategy requires 
access to stars and the ability to secure their engagement. At best, a 
producer has personal relations to stars allowing for direct contact 
without involving an agency. Furthermore, producers need a reputation 
that provides trust for the stars that the project will be successful and 
supports their career. In some instances missing personal relations and 
reputation might be substituted by a higher upfront fee or sizeable profit 
participation. Usually, the elements guiding expectations in the 
development phase are accompanied by massive marketing efforts. Again 
the objective is to reduce to probability of loss even for the sake of 
increasing the potential amount of loss. During the development phase 
this strategy means a movie project constitutes an acceptable risk if it is 
marketable. One producer points out the double-sided aspect of this 
strategy: If a project is based solely on Tom Hanks playing the lead role 
but he is not available, the project turns into a “bad risk” with a rather 
high probability of loss. 
A second strategy option is to shift risks to public funding and reduce 
them with relation to forerunners. The availability of public funding that 
can account for half of a movie’s budget considerably reduces the urgency 
of risk control. If half the budget is borne by a film board or similar 
institution, the potential amount of loss is cut to half (see Figure 4: b). 
For producers using this strategy it is most important to attract public 
funding. According to the respondents, three options are available that 
can be combined. First, the objectives of the film board must be known 
and the actual project has to address the explicit or implicit interest of 
the selection committee. Second, personal contacts to individuals at the 
93 von Rimscha—Managing Risk in Motion Picture Project Development 
 
film board need to be cultivated as they create a trust base that the 
proposed project is realized as planned and addresses the promised 
objectives. Thirdly, this includes building a reputation as one of the 
respondents suggests that funding the project will serve the objectives of 
the film board. To control the remaining risk and to further build trust, 
producers try to reduce the risk by relying on a successful forerunner to 
the script. The publicity and popularity of a novel or similar forerunner 
shall guarantee audience interest as well as familiarity among members 
of a selection committee. The essential trait of a producer is access to 
risk-reducing stories. It is gained via personal relations to writers and 
publishers and a reputation to successfully transform literature into film 
art. Producers believe their reputation together with the size and quality 
of their personal network determines their success. 
The third strategy option reducing the potential amount of loss (see 
Figure 4: c) is available to all producers; however it is a necessity for 
those who lack access to stars or public funding. The most important 
measure is rigid cost control. If the budget can be reduced dramatically, 
the potential amount of loss might become small enough to accept the 
residual risk even if the probability of loss remains the same. This 
strategy is not aimed at the cause of the risk, but addresses and reduces 
potential effects. Cost can be reduced by not employing stars, or asking 
them to postpone their fees, by not buying expensive rights to popular 
forerunners, and by choosing a less expensive way to stage the story. 
Parodies seem especially interesting, since they allow using of the 
popularity of a well known story without the license costs. Again, 
reputation is key to this strategy since actors and service companies need 
to trust the producer if they are to postpone their fees. Due to the 
moderate potential amount of loss, the remaining production risk can be 
accepted by the producer. The consumption risk is also reduced, which 
means the distributors might be willing to bear it themselves and not 
shift it to the producer. With a presale of rights the distributor carries 
the consumption risk. 
 
Controlling Creative Risks in Movie Project Development 
Besides the strategies addressing financial risk just introduced, all 
producers point out the relevance of their intuition when identifying 
promising project elements. Whenever creative acclaim is defined as a 
second objective along with commercial success, the producers’ actions 
become less systematic and are oriented predominantly towards the 
producers’ personal taste and gut feeling. This behavior is not considered 
to be commercially feasible in the long run. Producers, relying on their 
intuition when controlling risks, do so only for some of their projects. The 
same is possible in case of having a personal risk diversification through 
another occupation in a different industry sector. Generally, emphasizing 
creativity is not considered an investment in reputation, which could be 
capitalized in a subsequent project. Winning an award  does  not  help  to  
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Figure 4: Risk Management Strategies in Movie Development and Their 
Effect on the Level of Risk 
 
 
 
 
secure funding in the future, however it might help with some film board 
selection committee members. The effect on hiring personnel in future is 
described as ambiguous. One producer says that two of his  past  projects 
were a mix of a labor of love and an intentional investment in his artistic 
reputation. One was a flop, while the other has helped to shape his 
reputation and opened some doors. 
When it comes to the creative part of the job, producers often drop 
out of their role as project managers. They cannot quantify the potential 
loss or gain in creative merits, the probability of such an effect or the 
effect on their reputation. The common denominator is to treat your 
personnel fair and give them some but not too much freedom. Several 
interviewees point out the importance of thorough planning and iterative 
steps in rewriting a script. Ample development time is described as 
crucial. However, one producer believes an idea, which takes too long to 
develop, lose edge and liveliness. Generally, no strategic behavior or 
project risk management can be observed for the reputation risk and for 
the creative objectives. 
The effects of strategies to control financial risks on creative 
objectives are not clear. Public funding might allow more experimental 
projects, however the hiring of a star or the reduction of production cost 
does not necessarily harm creative goals. Some independent producers 
even believe budget constrains help to improve a movie project, since 
they demand and lead to creative rather than expensive solutions. 
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SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES OF 
PRODUCERS  
When several projects are analyzed and compared, the focus is on the 
qualities of the producer as project manager rather than on the project 
risk management of a single movie package development. Each 
development process leads to a Green Light decision where the key 
project resources of the proposed movie package are evaluated. Although 
each decision is unique, they all boil down to the question whether the 
producers succeed in securing the most relevant resources, content 
personnel and funding. Interpreting producers as firm in search of a 
sustainable competitive advantage, it becomes evident that they do not 
need to command theses resources but they need to cultivate access 
competence as a dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997) of continuously 
securing project resources (see Figure 5). The project resources are 
interdependent and their influence on both the Green Light and the 
ultimate success with the audience is neither linear nor univocal. 
Depending on market conditions and individual access competence, 
producers choose different strategies to control risk in the development 
phase of a movie project. They have to start of envisioning their position 
in the industry and thus rank the importance of resources. However, it 
seems as if producers consider their strategy options rather limited. 
 
Figure 5: Producer resources 
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From an analytical standpoint this allows identifying distinct 
producer types that use the same strategies. For producers working in 
the industry and their investors the similarity of control strategies might 
be considered problematic since it leads to very similar movie packages 
that do not stand out from other proposals. Obtaining the best possible 
input resources of course reduces the risk of failure; however, if the best 
resources are controlled by competitors, the risk of failure increases. 
However, the interviewees say that producers do not actively build 
coordination or access competences, but use structural constraints as 
guidelines when conducting their risk management. Thus it might be 
reasonable for producers not to believe too much in common wisdom 
about structural constraints in the industry to allow for a fresh 
evaluation of all the inputs and their value. Today the strategies used to 
control risks in the development phase seem to be determined by the 
relevant market conditions underestimating the relative value of certain 
project resources. Due to power relations in the value chain, producers 
focus on controlling the consumption risk. Their reputation as a crucial 
success factor seems to be considered a casual result of their work which 
is not actively managed. 
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